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Liability (and) Rules for Health
Information
Jorge L. Contreras† & Francisca Nordfalk††
Abstract
The recent trend toward propertization of health data could pose
significant challenges to biomedical research and public health.
Property rule systems can result in sizable up-front costs in the
acquisition of consent from individual data subjects, as well as the
ongoing risk that data subjects will retract consent or object to
unanticipated data uses, thus compromising existing data resources and
analyses. Instead, we propose that research using individual health data
should be subject to a regulatory regime, enforceable by
government/public repositories, while at the same time permitting
private enforcement actions to address particularized individual injury.
Thus, while the physical collection of human tissue would continue to
be subject to existing rules regarding informed consent, ex ante consent
would not be required for the use of information derived from physical
samples. Rather, rules regarding permissible research use and handling
of health information would be put in place, and violations of those
rules would be dealt with on an ex post basis, both through regulatory
penalties and private liability actions. These recommendations are
supported by two cases studies: the Utah Population Database and
Statistics Denmark, both of which provide examples of successful health
data repositories that are governed by regulatory systems. While these
examples are drawn from governmental data resources, the approach
that they exemplify can be extended to academic and other research
environments. These case studies suggest that regulatory and liability
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models should be considered more broadly for the governance of
research using human health data in lieu of property-based systems.
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Introduction
In the wake of recent scandals involving the use and abuse of
individual data by commercial entities,1 a number of new proposals

1.

See generally Taylor Amerding, The 17 Biggest Data Breaches of the 21st
Century, CSO (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.csoonline.com/article/
2130877/data-breach/the-biggest-data-breaches-of-the-21st-century.html;
Alexis C. Madrigal, What We Know About Facebook’s Latest Data
Scandal, THE ATLANTIC (Jun. 4, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2018/06/what-we-know-about-facebooks-latest-datascandal/561992/; Jennifer Dudley-Nicholson, Social Media Data Scandal:
It’s Not Just Facebook, FRASER COAST CHRON. (May 1, 2018),
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have emerged to recognize personal property interests in individual
health data. These proposals have largely been made by aspiring data
intermediaries that would employ technologies such as Blockchain2 to
enable consumers to control the flow of their personal health data. The
intermediaries would then act as the consumers’ representative in
selling that data to healthcare providers, pharmaceutical
manufacturers, and anyone else interested in it, remitting a portion of
the revenue back to the consumer.3 The linchpin of this attractive new
business model is establishing individual ownership of personal data.
Without ownership, companies, hospitals, insurers, and data
intermediaries can (and today do) aggregate and sell individual health
information without consulting, or paying, the individual.4 But if
consumers owned their data, then anyone that tried to use or sell it
without permission would be stealing (or at least liable for the tort of
conversion).
The notion of individual data ownership seems to be catching on.
A handful of U.S. states have enacted legislation purporting to give
individuals ownership over their genetic information.5 Even former
https://www.frasercoastchronicle.com.au/news/social-media-datascandal-its-not-just-facebook-bu/3403026/.
2.

Blockchain in a relatively new, “tamperproof” form of technology,
famously employed by bitcoin. Arjun Kharpal, Everything You Need to
Know
About
the
Blockchain,
CNBC
(Jun.
18,
2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/18/blockchain-what-is-it-and-how-doesit-work.html. See also Megan Molteni, These DNA Startups Want to Put
All of You on the Blockchain, WIRED (Nov. 16, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/these-dna-startups-want-to-put-all-of-youon-the-blockchain/.

3.

See, e.g., Megan Scudellari, Get Paid for Your Genetic Data, IEEE
SPECTRUM (Mar. 1, 2018), https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-humanos/biomedical/diagnostics/paying-for-genetic-data-with-cryptocurrency
(describing plans by start-up Nebula Genomics to enable consumers to
own and sell access to their data to pharmaceutical companies using
Blockchain technology); Ron Miller, Hu-manity Wants to Create a Health
Data Marketplace With Help From Blockchain, TECHCRUNCH (Jul. 18,
2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/07/18/hu-manity-wants-to-createa-health-data-marketplace-with-help-from-blockchain/; Misha Angrist,
Do You Belong to You? GENOME, Jan. 2, 2018, at 44-45 (discussing Genos,
which claimed that customers would retain ownership of their exome data
while receiving “transparent compensation for research studies in which
they participate[d]”); Leonard J. Kish & Eric J. Topol, Unpatients – Why
Patients Should Own Their Medical Data, 33 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY
921, 923 (2015) [hereinafter Kish & Topol, Unpatients] (“we have
proposed a technological solution that allows biomedical data to be shared
and traded as property at a very granular level”).

4.

Miller, supra note 3; see Kish & Topol, Unpatients, supra note 3, at 922.

5.

See Anya E.R. Prince, Comprehensive Protection of Genetic Information:
One Size Privacy or Property Models May Not Fit All, 79 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 175, 195–98 (2013) (discussing statutory enactments in Alaska,
Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana, and Florida). But see OR. PUBLIC HEALTH
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President Barack Obama expressed the view that “if somebody does a
test on me or my genes . . . that’s mine.”6
But despite its rhetorical and populist appeal, the recent trend
toward propertization of personal health information could pose
significant challenges to both biomedical research and public health.
Assigning property rights to personal information could result in
researchers incurring (or being unable to afford) sizable up-front costs
to acquire permission to conduct most forms of data-based research and
could limit the amount of data that public health officials can collect
and utilize for the public benefit. Moreover, the hallmark of personal
property -- the right to exclude -- poses an ongoing risk that individuals
could retract or narrow their consent to data use after it has been given,
thus compromising existing data resources and analyses.
In their landmark Harvard Law Review article,7 Guido Calabresi
and Doug Melamed elucidate the now-familiar dichotomy between
property rules and liability rules. Property rules, they explain, permit
the holder of an entitlement (a property interest) to prevent others from
encroaching on the enjoyment of that entitlement, just as a landowner
may prevent trespassers from entering his land.8 Liability rules, on the
other hand, do not grant an a priori entitlement to prevent trespass,
but do provide the aggrieved party with a legal remedy (usually
damages) if such an encroachment occurs (i.e., allowing the land owner
to recover monetary damages as compensation for a trespass).9 Since its
introduction to the literature, this distinction has shed light on the
nature of legal rules and rulemaking in contexts ranging from air
pollution,10 to accidents,11 to intellectual property,12 to database

DIV., HISTORY OF OREGON’S GENETIC PRIVACY LAW 1-3 (2007) (discussing
1995 enactment and 2001 repeal of genetic property legislation in Oregon).
6.

Julie Hirschfeld Davis, President Weighs in on Data from Genes, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2016, at A15. But see Jorge L. Contreras, Letter to the
Editor: The President Says Patients Should Own Their Genetic Data.
He’s Wrong. 34 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 585, 585-586 (2016) [hereinafter
Contreras, Letter] (criticizing this view).

7.

Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089,
1089 (1972).

8.

Id. at 1092.

9.

Id. at 1105–06, 1116, 1119–20.

10.

See id. at 1115-24.

11.

See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 3 (1970); STEVEN
SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 130 (1987).

12.

See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law,
89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1665 (2003); Dan Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace,
21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 124-28 (1999).
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protection,13 to criminal law.14 In prior work, Contreras extended this
analysis to human genetic data,15 and Jane Baron has touched on its
implications for electronic health records.16
In this article, we argue that property rule frameworks are
inadequate and inappropriate for the governance of human health
data.17 Instead, we support a combination of regulatory governance
coupled, in some circumstances, with private liability remedies. In
support of this structure, we introduce two new case studies from health
data repositories in the United States (the Utah Population Database)
and Denmark (Statistics Denmark) in which regulatory approaches
have been utilized successfully to safeguard individual privacy and data
security while at the same time promoting the research enterprise. We
thus recommend that these models be considered more broadly for the
governance of human health data.
The remainder of this article proceeds in three principal parts. Part
I summarizes recent trends toward propertization of health data, both
in the literature and in U.S. litigation. Part II summarizes the
theoretical frameworks for allocating initial entitlements and controlling
risk introduced by Calabresi and Melamed and by Steven Shavell, and
then explores an alternative framework for health data, including an
analysis of available remedies and the role of public authorities in
monitoring and enforcing such rules. Part III presents two case studies
in which regulatory frameworks have successfully been used for health
data: the Utah Population Database and Statistics Denmark. We
conclude with recommendations and directions for future research.

13.

J. H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research
Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual
Property Environment, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315, 387 n.372, 395,
410 (2003).

14.

See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1124-27; Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM L. REV. 1193 (1985).

15.

Jorge L. Contreras, Genetic Property, 105 GEO. L.J. 1 (2016).

16.

Jane B. Baron, Property as Control: The Case of Information, 18 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 367, 380 (2012).

17.

Individual health information includes a wide range of elements including
medical records, test results, clinical data, tissue samples, and data
concerning an individual’s age, health history, family history, community,
ethnicity, and other demographic information. For an excellent discussion
of these data types, see Barbara J. Evans, Much Ado About Data
Ownership, 25 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 69, 90–2 (2011). The extension of data
sharing and similar principles from the field of genomics to health
information more generally is discussed in Jorge L. Contreras & Bartha
M. Knoppers, The Genomic Commons, 19 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUMAN
GENETICS 429, 431-32 (2018).
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I. Property Rules and Health Data
A. The Propertization of Health Data

Traditionally, U.S. law has treated the use of information, once it
is disclosed,18 as free from property entitlements. No property interest
exists in facts or information once they are generally known.19 Rather,
facts are part of the public domain, described by Justice Louis Brandeis
as “free as the air to common use.”20 The unencumbered status of
information has been recognized in cases involving not only current
news21 and sports scores,22 but also genetic and other health data. In
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., the Supreme
Court held that the information contained in naturally occurring
human DNA molecules cannot be patented.23 Likewise, in cases
including Moore v. Regents of the University of California,24
Washington University v. Catalona,25 and Greenberg v. Miami
Children’s Hospital Research Institute, Inc.,26 federal and state courts
18.

The law of trade secrets addresses information that is both commercially
valuable and held in confidence. Trade secrets, which are commonly
viewed as “intellectual property,” derive their value, if not their very
existence, from their secrecy. See Susan C. Miller, Florida’s Uniform
Trade Secret Act, 16 FLA. ST. L. REV. 863 (1988). The focus of this paper,
however, is on information that is disclosed or derived in a manner that
is beyond the scope of trade secret protection. In particular, the following
categories of information about an individual would not normally be
considered trade secrets: information that the individual has previously
disclosed or which is a matter of public record (e.g., address, birth date),
information that is observable either to the naked eye or upon a medical
examination, information that is derived from the analysis of an
individual’s tissue or DNA. These categories of information, to the extent
that they are legally protected are protected under laws and regulations
pertaining to privacy, as discussed below.

19.

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1991);
Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918).

20.

Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

21.

Id. at 234.

22.

See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 853 (2d Cir.
1997).

23.

Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., No. 12–398, slip
op. at 10-18 (U.S. June 13, 2013).

24.

Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 493 (Cal. 1990).

25.

Washington Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 673 (8th Cir. 2007).

26.

Greenberg v. Miami Child. Hosp. Res. Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1074
(S.D. Fla. 2003) (Plaintiffs provided Defendants with tissue and health
information that Plaintiffs intended for Defendants to use to research a
specific disease. Without the Plaintiff’s knowledge, Defendants submitted
a patent application for a genetic sequence identified. The court did not
recognize that Plaintiffs had any legal claim to the fruits of the research).
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have refused to recognize a personal property interest in discoveries and
information obtained through the analysis of human biological material,
irrespective of whether or not that material was obtained legally.27
The trend toward data propertization has also been seen in Europe.
Despite a general legal understanding in most European countries that
data is not itself subject to property protection,28 the new European
General Data Protection Regulation imposes significant protections for
individual data including the right for individuals to exert rights of
portability and erasure over data about themselves.29 As recently
observed by Nadya Purtova, these features offer a regulatory framework
that bears a strong resemblance to a property rule system.30
Notwithstanding the general principle that unprotected data is not
a form of property, there has recently been a resurgence of interest in
treating individual health information under a property rule
framework.31 Numerous scholars, policymakers, and advocates, drawing
on earlier debates concerning property interests in personal information,
generally,32 as well as the ownership of human tissue, body parts and

27.

In Moore, for example, the court found that Mr. Moore’s physician at
UCLA committed both deception and violation of his fiduciary duty.
Nevertheless, the court declined to recognize a property interest in Mr.
Moore’s extracted cells and tissue or the discoveries made with them. See
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479, 493 (Cal. 1990).

28.

See John Rumbold & Barbara Pierscionek, Why Patients Shouldn’t
“Own” Their Medical Records, 34 NATURE BIOTECH. 586, 586 (2016).

29.

Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 27 April 2016, Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data,
and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC [hereinafter GDPR].

30.

See Nadezhda Purtova, Do Property Rights in Personal Data Make Sense
After the Big Data Turn? 10 J. L. ECON. REG. 208, 214 (2017).

31.

See, e.g., Angrist, supra note 3, at 43; Mark A. Rothstein, Ethical Issues
in Big Data Health Research, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 425, 427 (2015)
(“many individuals strongly believe that their biological specimens and
health records ‘belong to them.’”); Richard H. Thaler, Show Us the Data.
(It’s
Ours,
After
All),
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
23,
2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/24/business/24view.html;
Evans,
supra note 17, at 73 (citing media calls for patient ownership of health
data).

32.

See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2056, 2094 (2004) (proposing a five-part framework
defining rights in personal information); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND
OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 228 (2006) (proposing a property-based
framework to protect online privacy); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives:
Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373,
1379 (2000) [hereinafter Cohen, Examined Lives]; Jessica Litman,
Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1289
(2000).
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indigenous resources,33 have argued that property rights in genetic data
and other health information should be legally recognized. The
rationales marshalled in favor of data propertization are varied, ranging
from concerns over individual autonomy; privacy and dignity;34 to
enabling individuals to sell their data and thus share in the financial
rewards reaped by others (e.g., pharmaceutical firms);35 to offering an
alternative (and an antidote) to the increasing control of personal data
by large corporations;36 to considerations of group dynamics and social
interactions;37 to enabling patients to access information about

33.

See, e.g., R. Alta Charo, Body of Research – Ownership and Use of
Human Tissue, 355 N. ENG. J. MED. 1517 (2006).

34.

See, e.g., Jessica L. Roberts, Progressive Genetic Ownership, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1105, 1158-59 (2018) (summarizing arguments re
autonomy, privacy, identity); Leonard J. Kish & Eric J. Topol,
Correspondence, 34 NATURE BIOTECH. 586, 587 (2016) [hereinafter Kish
& Topol, Correspondence] (responding to Rumbold & Pierscionek, supra
note 28) (“Our personal autonomy increasingly depends upon our digital
autonomy”).

35.

See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 34, at 1164 (“legally recognized genetic
ownership rights could result in financial compensation . . . Sources of
genetic data would enjoy some measure of wealth in the exchange”); Kish
& Topol, Unpatients, supra note 3, at 923 (“To build a truly thriving
health data economy, we need to harness the power of data ownership”);
Mark A. Hall & Kevin A. Schulman, Ownership of Medical Information,
301 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1282, 1284 (2009) (the assignment of “economic
value to the access, control, and use of the medical information contained
in electronic health record networks” would empower patients); David F.
Partlett, Misuse of Genetic Information: The Common Law and
Professionals’ Liability, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 489, 497 (2003) (“If the
genetic information is property, it can presumably be sold, leading to a
market in the information.”); Bartha Maria Knoppers, Population
Genetics and Benefit Sharing, 3 COMMUNITY GENETICS 212, 213 (2000)
(collecting statements on benefit sharing from international organizations
including WHO, UNESCO, HUGO); Anita L. Allen, Genetic Privacy:
Emerging Concepts and Values, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 31, 51 (Mark A.
Rothstein ed., 1997) (allowing individuals to sell their genetic information
could enable them to participate in the market and avoid exploitation by
others).

36.

See, e.g., Purtova, supra note 30, at 218 (“digital giants like Google and
Facebook harvest, hoard, hold monopoly over and exclusively profit from
the pools of data collected through their various services, whereas these
pools are not available to anyone else . . . . Allocating property rights in
personal data to individuals . . . will arguably help avoid this enclosure”).

37.

See, e.g., Natalie Ram, DNA by the Entirety, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 873,
906–10 (2015) (proposing that DNA be owned through a “tenancy by the
entirety” joint ownership model in order to account for the interests of
related family members); Laura Maria Franciosi & Attilio Guarneri, The
Protection of Genetic Identity, 1 J. CIV. L. STUD. 139, 186 (2008)
(“[P]roperty laws may better serve as a paradigm to ensure that a greater
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themselves that is not currently available from their healthcare
providers.38
These policy positions have also been advanced by litigants seeking
to assert property interests in human genetic information and related
biological samples. Notably, in Beleno v. Lakey, four Texas families
sued the State of Texas for unauthorized use of blood samples routinely
collected from newborns as part of a state program to screen for birth
defects.39 The families brought suit when they discovered that, following
the initial screening, the state continued to store and use these samples
for purposes of epidemiological, environmental exposure and other
research.40 They claimed, among other things, that the state’s failure to
obtain their express consent to ongoing research violated their privacy
and other rights.41 In settling the litigation, the state agreed to destroy
its entire repository of 5.3 million infant blood samples, eliminating any
possibility of their use in future research.42 Similar lawsuits have been
brought in other states43 and have led, among other things, to the
enactment of the federal Newborn Screening Saves Lives

level of protection is provided for information that belongs to all of the
individuals involved.”).
38.

Kish & Topol, Unpatients, supra note 3, at 922 (“the US legal framework
is constructed in a manner to block individuals from accessing their own
medical data”); Kish & Topol, Correspondence, supra note 34, at 587
(discussing example of a patient who was unable to obtain data from the
manufacturer of his own implanted defibrillator).

39.

See Beleno v. Lakey, 306 F.Supp.3d 930, 936 (W.D. Tex. 2009). For a
history of newborn blood screening programs, see Sonia M. Suter, Did
You Give the Government Your Baby’s DNA? Rethinking Consent in
Newborn Screening, 15 MINN J.L. SCI. & TECH. 729, 734–37 (2014).

40.

Peggy Fikac, State to Destroy Newborns’ Blood Samples, HOUS. CHRON.
(Dec. 22, 2009), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/
State-to-destroy-newborns-blood-samples-1599212.php; see generally
Suter, supra note 39, at 754–57 (describing additional research uses of
newborn blood spots).

41.

Beleno, 306 F.Supp.3d at 936. In Texas, participation in the screening
program was required by law, with a right to opt-out for religious reasons
only. See Suter, supra note 39, at 784.

42.

Adam Doerr, Newborn Blood Spot Litigation: 70 Days to Destroy 5+
Million
Samples,
PRIVACY
REP.
(Feb.
2,
2010),
https://theprivacyreport.com/2010/02/02/newborn-blood-spot-litigation
-70-days-to-destroy-5-million-samples/; Fikac, supra note 40.

43.

See, e.g., Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d 766, 776 (Minn. 2011) (deciding
the use of newborn blood spots for research purposes without consent
violated Minnesota law). See generally Suter, supra note 39, at 757–59
(discussing state cases challenging infant blood spot collection and
storage).
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Reauthorization Act of 2014, which requires explicit parental consent
for all research on newborn blood samples.44
Another recent case involved the Havasupai Indian Tribe. In 1989,
representatives of the tribe approached researchers at Arizona State
University (ASU) to investigate high rates of diabetes among tribe
members.45 The researchers collected approximately 200 blood samples
from members of the tribe using an informed consent document that
purported to authorize research concerning “the causes of
behavioral/medical disorders.”46 By 1991, the researchers concluded
that there was no genetic link to the high incidence of diabetes within
the tribe.47 After the initial study, other ASU researchers continued to
use the DNA collected from tribe members in other research projects,
including investigations of schizophrenia and ancient human migratory
patterns.48 When the tribe learned of this additional research it sued
ASU for $50 million, claiming that the non-diabetes research was
unauthorized and constituted a breach of fiduciary duty, fraud,
negligence, and trespass to chattels.49 The parties settled the suit in
2010, with ASU paying $700,000 to forty-one tribe members and
agreeing to return all remaining DNA to the tribe.50 Several other
documented cases exist in which research has been curtailed or
discontinued after complaints were lodged by representatives of tribal
or other local groups that contributed original biological specimens for
research.51
These cases demonstrate that research participants have
increasingly asserted52 broad rights to prevent “their” data from being
44.

Newborn Screening Saves Lives Reauthorization Act of 2014, Pub. L. No.
113-240, 128 Stat. 2851 (2014); 45 C.F.R. § 46.408 (2019).

45.

Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063, 1066 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2008). A summary of the background and facts of the case can
be found in Leslie E. Wolf, Biology & Genetics: Advancing Research
on Stored Biological Materials: Reconciling Law, Ethics, and Practice,
11 MINN J.L. SCI. & TECH. 99, 118–125 (2010).

46.

Michelle M. Mello & Leslie E. Wolf, The Havasupai Indian Tribe Case—
Lessons for Research Involving Stored Biologic Samples, 363 NEW ENGL.
J. MED. 204, 204 (2010).

47.

Havasupai, 204 P.3d at 1067.

48.

Id.

49.

Id. at 1069–71.

50.

See Jennifer Couzin-Frankel, DNA Returned to Tribe, Raising Questions
About Consent, 328 SCIENCE 558, 558 (2010); Mello & Wolf, supra note
46, at 204-05.

51.

See, e.g., Couzin-Frankel, supra note 50.

52.

Both the Beleno and Havasupai cases were settled by the parties prior to
the courts’ rulings on the merits. Beleno v. Lakey, 306 F.Supp.3d 930, 936
(W.D. Tex. 2009); Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d
1063, 1066 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
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used for unauthorized purposes, even when the use of that data poses
no meaningful physical or psychological threat to them.53 They also
suggest that earlier precedents such as Moore54 and Greenberg,55 which
rejected property-like ownership of individual data, are at risk of being
eroded in the current legal climate.
B. Informed Consent and Property Rules for Data Research

The principal mechanism through which property-like control over
human health data has emerged is an increasingly expansionist view of
the doctrine of informed consent. This doctrine, which took its current
form in response to abuses committed by researchers both during and
after World War II, offers necessary protections to the human subjects
of medical experimentation.56 But this otherwise essential doctrine has
been expanded beyond its original contours to become what Contreras
has referred to as “propertizing consent.”57 With propertizing consent,
the permission sought from an individual to undergo a medical
procedure, including something as simple as a cheek swab or blood
draw, invests that individual with a property-like interest in all
resulting data. A requirement that advance permission for the use of
data be sought before research can commence is akin to giving an
individual an ownership interest in all information about himself or
herself. The reliance on individual consent for data-based research,
which is unlikely to cause physical or psychological harm to the
individual, enables the individual to exert a property-like right to
exclude with respect to that data.
The informed consent requirement and other human research
protections are currently codified under U.S. law as part of the so-called
“Common Rule” that applies to all federally funded research concerning
human subjects.58 Alongside the Common Rule is the HIPAA Privacy
Rule, which establishes detailed regulations regarding the collection,
use, storage, and disclosure of protected health information (PHI) by
healthcare providers, laboratories, payers, and other “covered
entities.”59 While numerous exceptions and exemptions under the
53.

For a discussion of the potential threats alleged to accompany data-based
research, see Contreras, Genetic Property, supra note 15, at 44-48.

54.

Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 488-93 (Cal. 1990).

55.

Greenberg v. Miami Child. Hosp. Res. Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1074
(S.D. Fla. 2003).

56.

See NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAV. RES., THE BELMOND REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES
AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH
(1979).

57.

Contreras, Genetic Property, supra note 15, at 6-7.

58.

General Requirements for Informed Consent, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2019).

59.

45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2019).
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Common Rule and HIPAA Privacy Rule may be applied to research
using human health data that has been de-identified (stripped of
identifying data that can be linked back to individuals), these
exceptions are complex, incomplete, and subject to differing
interpretations.60 Moreover, there is increasing criticism of the informed
consent requirement itself, given that current consent documentation,
like computer click-through agreements, are lengthy and legalistic,
neither giving the average consumer useful information or obtaining
from them genuine consent.61
The desire for property-like control over health data is not unique
to the United States. In Europe, signs of data propertization have
existed for some time in certain countries, particularly in the context
of biobanking.62 However, the recently-enacted EU-wide General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR)63 has received the most attention in this
regard.64 As in the United States, the ability to process personal data

60.

After all, these exceptions did little to rebut the claims in the Beleno and
Havasupai cases. See also I. Glenn Cohen & Michelle M. Mello, HIPAA
and Protecting Health Information in the 21st Century, 320 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N. 231, 231 (2018) (identifying shortcomings in protections offered by
HIPAA); Contreras, Genetic Property, supra note 15, at 33-34 (discussing
gaps in regulatory exceptions for data-based research). See also Lisa M.
Austin & David Lie, Safe Sharing Sites, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2019) (“[s]trategies to mitigate the risks of re-identification affect the
accuracy of the data”).

61.

See Purtova, supra note 30, at 219; Barbara A. Koenig, Have We Asked
Too Much of Consent? 44 HASTINGS CENT. REP. 33, 33 (2014) (“mounting
evidence suggests the distance between the ideal of consent and its actual
practice”); Patrick Taylor, When Consent Gets in the Way, 456 NATURE
32, 32 (2008); Howard Brody, Transparency: Informed Consent in
Primary Care, 19 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 5, 5 (1989) (“Physicians may also
view informed consent as an empty charade, since they are confident in
their abilities to manipulate consent by how they discuss or divulge
information.”).

62.

See, e.g., Luca Marelli & Guiseppe Testa, Scrutinizing the EU General
Data Protection Regulation: How Will New Decentralized Governance
Impact Research? 360 SCIENCE 496, 498 (2018) (discussing the Italian
Data Protection Authority’s decision to block the acquisition of an Italian
health and genomic database by a UK firm and subsequent reversal of
this decision by an Italian court); Kish & Topol, Unpatients, supra note
3, at 924 (describing Swiss Healthbank which “empowers users to store,
manage, share and benefit from their personal health information” and
“has the intent to create a global data transaction platform to support
medical research”).

63.

GDPR, supra note 29.

64.

The GDPR has shifted European privacy regulation from a centralized
approval-based system dominated by national data protection authorities
to a decentralized system in which responsibility for data protection is
placed on data users and the determination of authorized users devolves
to individual data subjects. See Marelli & Testa, supra note 62, at 496.
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under the GDRP is based on individual consent, a concept that has, for
many of the reasons cited in the United States, been subject to
criticism.65 The GDPR appears to give researchers the ability to rely on
broad, non-specific consent when “keeping with recognised ethical
standards for scientific research,”66 though subsequent interpretive
guidance may retreat from this position.67 As in the United States, it is
unclear what may or may not be permitted under EU regulations
concerning informed consent,68 potentially leading risk-averse
institutions to follow the most conservative approach, thereby
perpetuating and extending existing tendencies toward data
propertization.
C. Consequences of the Propertization of Health Data

Numerous commentators have cautioned against the recognition of
property-like interests in human health information on grounds both

See also Purtova, supra note 30, at 211 (discussing property-like interests
arising from GDPR right to data portability).
65.

See Marelli & Testa, supra note 62, at 496 (“the inherently open-ended
potential of data, whose digital compatibility makes them valuable for
research pursuits that may be wholly disjoined from the original project
within which samples or data were gathered, thus undermining the
classical rationale for ‘informed consent.’”); Purtova, supra note 30, at
216.

66.

GDPR, supra note 29, at Recital 33.

67.

See generally, GUIDELINES ON CONSENT UNDER REGULATION 2016/679,
ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=615239 (last visited Mar.
2, 2019) (cited and discussed in Marelli & Testa, supra note 62, at 497)
(establishing narrower guidelines in regard to giving and receiving
consent).

68.

See Marelli & Testa, supra note 62, at 497 (noting that reconsideration
of Italian database transfer case, discussed supra note 62, under the
GDPR will shape future interpretation of consent requirement for data
research).
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moral69 and doctrinal.70 The motivating force behind this article,
however, is the practical impact that propertization may have on the
conduct of biomedical research and public health monitoring. This
impact flows largely from the traditional common law attributes of
property: principally the right of a property owner to exclude others
from intruding on that property, as well as the rights of a property
owner to limit use of, or even destroy, that property and to choose to
alienate and profit from the transfer of that property.71
Our primary concern is that the recognition of a property interest
in individual health data could disrupt data-driven research if
individuals have the right to withhold, recall, constrain, or destroy data
after it enters the research pool.72 As noted above, this right was claimed

69.

See, e.g., Angrist, supra note 3, at 45 (quoting bioethicist Hank Greely,
“Owning kidneys makes people think of slavery. They think it degrades
humanity”); Baron, supra note 16, at 381-90 (property law concepts such
as alienability and in rem treatment are difficult to translate to the realm
of personal health data); Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from
Property: Toward a Deeper Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 798–811 (2004) (claiming that certain things
such as human tissue should never be alienable on dignitary grounds);
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849
(1987) (certain things should not be subject to market transactions). Cf.
Marc Rodwin, The Case for Public Ownership of Patient Data, 302 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N. 86 (2009) (arguing against corporate ownership of patient
data on moral and practical grounds).

70.

See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Is There a Duty to Share Healthcare Data?, in
BIG DATA, HEALTH LAW, AND BIOETHICS 209, 212-14 (I. Glenn Cohen et
al. eds., 2018) (refuting Lockean arguments for property in health data)
[hereinafter Cohen, Duty to Share]; Barbara J. Evans, Barbarians at the
Gate: Consumer-Driven Health Data Commons and the Transformation
of Citizen Science, 42 AM. J. L. & MED. 651, 657 (2016) (arguing that
many protections sought to be achieved through property law already
exist in the regulatory frameworks that govern medical records and
research); Barbara J. Evans, Would Patient Ownership of Health Data
Improve Confidentiality?, 14 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 724, 728 (2012)
(“There are few discernible differences between the level of confidentiality
patients would enjoy if they owned their data and biospecimens and what
they presently have under the HIPAA Privacy Rule and the Common
Rule.”).

71.

As famously described by Sir William Blackstone, property is “that sole
and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe.” SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, KNT.,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 393 (1893).

72.

See Wolf, supra note 45, at 142 (arguing that the right to withdraw
from a research study entails the right to prevent further use of data);
Amy L. McGuire & Laura M. Beskow, Informed Consent in Genomics
and Genetic Research, 11 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUMAN GENETICS 361,
370 (2010) (suggesting that research subjects that withdraw from studies
be permitted to require that repositories discontinue use of personal data).
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by the plaintiffs in the Beleno and Havasupai cases.73 Yet data-driven
biomedical research depends on the existence of a stable and accessible
data resource. For example, large-scale studies such as All of Us by the
NIH plan to enroll and collect data from up to a million individuals.74
In order to make the greatest use of this data resource, researchers from
around the world will need to access, recombine, search, and manipulate
this data in whatever manner is most promising.75 In the words of
Francis Collins, Director of the National Institutes of Health, and
Harold Varmus, Director of the National Cancer Institute, this
flexibility is required “so that the world’s brightest scientific and clinical
minds can contribute insights and analysis.”76
In the world of global data sharing, the number of researchers
requiring access to a particular data element, and the specific research
questions that they will seek to answer, cannot be known at the time
that data is collected or consent to research is given. Thus, there is a
risk that consent that is too broad or non-specific could, upon later
examination, be deemed inadequate.77 And if so, the retroactive
withdrawal or destruction of individual data already incorporated into
large data pools and analyses could severely compromise and/or bias
such studies.78
What’s more, a requirement that researchers obtain consent from
every individual data subject prior to the commencement of research
using data obtained from that individual (i.e., ex ante) will impose a
substantial up-front burden on any sizable research program.79 The
Institute of Medicine has cited several studies showing that compliance

73.

Supra notes 39, 45 and accompanying text.

74.

About the All of Us Research Program, NAT’L INST. HEALTH,
https://allofus.nih.gov/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2019).

75.

See Francis S. Collins & Harold Varmus, A New Initiative on Precision
Medicine, 372 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 793, 794-95 (2015) (“Qualified
researchers from many organizations will, with appropriate protection of
patient confidentiality, have access to the cohort’s data”).

76.

Id. at 795.

77.

This claim was made by the Havasupai in their litigation against ASU.
See Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063, 1066 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2008). See also Marelli & Testa, supra note 62, at 497 (discussing
validity of broad consent under GDPR).

78.

See Contreras, Genetic Property, supra note 15, at 30 (“data and study
results become skewed toward those individuals who are most willing to
consent to research, whereas individuals who are less willing to consent
are underrepresented”). See also OECD, DATA-DRIVEN INNOVATION 19697 (2015) (identifying practical difficulties potentially arising from
individual data ownership).

79.

See, e.g., Rumbold & Pierscionek, supra note 28, at 586 (“Patient
‘ownership’ of data would have the potential to make access to aggregated
data more difficult and thus to hinder research”).

193

Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019
Liability (and) Rules for Health Information

with extensive data privacy and consent procedures has increased both
the difficulty of recruiting study subjects and the overall cost of
biomedical research.80 And, given the way that healthcare markets
work, this cost would likely be passed along to the consumer.81
The implications of data ownership on public health monitoring
and intervention is equally troubling. Today, primary healthcare
providers and emergency care centers can, and in many cases are
required to, report data regarding symptoms pointing to potential
disease outbreaks to public health officials.82 This reporting may include
data regarding individuals exhibiting such symptoms. Public health
officials can use this data to track potential outbreaks, to implement
containment strategies and to develop diagnostic tools and vaccines.83
Obtaining individual consent to the use of data in each of these critical
public health functions could severely impede the protection of public
health.84
The fragmentation of individual ownership interests in a large
resource pool can give rise to what theorists have termed an
“anticommons,” a situation in which progress is impeded due to the
significant transaction costs required to assemble rights from multiple
holders. The threat of anticommons in biomedical research was
originally identified with the proliferation of patents covering genetic
discoveries,85 but has recently been raised in connection with the
broadly disaggregated ownership of individual health data.86 Such an
80.

INST. MED., BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY,
IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH 218-20 (Sharyl J. Nass et al.,
eds., 2009). See also Cohen, Duty to Share, supra note 70, at 215-16
(noting cost estimates).

81.

See J. Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 32, at 1388 (“data privacy
opponents argue that increased protection would impose unreasonable
costs on routine consumer transactions—costs that consumers themselves
ultimately will have to bear”).

82.

Richard N. Danila et al., Legal Authority for Infectious Disease Reporting
in the United States: Case Study of the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic,
105(1) AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 13, 14 (2015); see, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 26-6-6(1) (LexisNexis 2019).

83.

Ruth Ann Jajosky & Samuel L Groseclose, Evaluation of Reporting
Timeliness of Public Health Surveillance Systems for Infectious Diseases,
BMC PUB. HEALTH 2 (2004) (“Reasons for conducting public health
surveillance can include the need to assess the health status of a
population, establish public health priorities, and reduce the burden of
disease in a population by appropriately targeting effective disease
prevention and control activities”).

84.

See Mark Rodwin, Patient Data: Property, Privacy & the Public Interest,
36 AM. J. L. & MED. 586, 589 (2010).

85.

Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998).

86.

See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, The Anticommons at 20: Concerns for
Research Continue, 361 SCIENCE 335, 337 (2018); Contreras, Genetic
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anticommons, if it materializes, can significantly impede efficient
transactions and thwart socially-beneficial activity.
For all of these reasons, individual property-like entitlements in
health data, whether imposed through the mechanism of informed
consent or otherwise, have the potential both to disrupt and
substantially increase the cost of socially beneficial biomedical research.
As the federal district court predicted in Greenberg, the recognition of
individual property rights in health data could “cripple medical
research.”87

II. Liability and Regulatory Rules for Health Data
Given the potential research challenges that could emerge as a
result of widespread recognition of property interests in personal health
data, it is worth considering whether there is an alternative framework
for managing individual privacy and related interests while at the same
time maximizing social welfare from biomedical research. As noted
above, a useful analytical starting point for analyzing this question is
offered by Calabresi and Melamed, who first drew the important
distinction between property rules and liability rules in the allocation
of entitlements between parties.88
A. Efficiency and Ex Ante versus Ex Post Systems

Under the Calabresi and Melamed framework, the initial allocation
of entitlements and the choice of property versus liability rules has both
efficiency, distributive, and justice-based consequences.89 We deal first
Property, supra note 15, at 7 (anticommons in genetic information); Jane
Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1,
4 (“Each individual has an incentive to remove her data from the
commons to avoid remote risks of re-identification. This way she gets
the best of both worlds: her data is safe, and she also receives the
indirect benefits of helpful health and policy research performed on
the rest of the data left in the commons. However, the collective
benefits derived from the data commons will rapidly degenerate if data
subjects opt out to protect themselves”). Rodwin, supra note 84, at 606
(“private ownership of patient data would probably preclude its most
valuable uses by fracturing population data”); Richard A. Spinello,
Property Rights in Genetic Information, 6 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 29, 35
(2004) (fragmented property rights in the genetic data coming from
multiple sources would require a substantial integration effort if that data
were needed for a particular research project). Somewhat
counterintuitively, Kish and Topol use the “tragedy of the commons” to
support their argument for individual ownership of health information.
Kish & Topol, Unpatients, supra note 3, at 923.
87.

Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp.
2d 1064, 1076 (S.D. Fla. 2003).

88.

See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1090.

89.

See id. at 1093-1105.
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with administrative efficiency.90 If, in a property rule regime, an
entitlement is initially allocated to the occupant of land, then a traveler
wishing to cross over than land must first obtain (and possibly pay for)
permission to cross.91 This ex ante requirement imposes an
administrative burden on each act of crossing over land: permission
must be sought and the right of passage must be negotiated in 100% of
cases. In a liability rule regime, however, the traveler may access the
land, but may later be sued for damages by the occupier.92
Coase tells us that, absent transaction costs, the land will either be
crossed or not crossed, no matter where the initial entitlements are
placed, depending on whether the occupier values her privacy more
than the traveler values that particular route across the countryside.93
That is, in either case an appropriate exchange of value will be
negotiated to enable the efficient outcome to occur. But, in reality, a
number of factors conspire to tilt the balance in one direction or
another. Thus, in the example of the traveler, it is likely that only a
subset of occupiers will seek ex post to recover the remedy to which
they are entitled (i.e., if the traveler is not detected or does not damage
the land, or if the cost of enforcing rights exceeds the occupier’s
predicted recovery, or if the traveler is a vagabond who would lack the
resources to satisfy any judgment against him).
A similar logic holds when the initial entitlement is placed with the
traveler, giving him an affirmative right to cross land occupied by
someone else. Under a property rule regime, the traveler, knowing his
desired route, may obtain a series of ex ante injunctive orders
prohibiting the occupier of each tract along the route from erecting a
fence blocking the route.94 This exercise, while guaranteed to assure the
traveler the ability to cross the countryside unimpeded, is likely to be
time consuming and costly. In a liability rule regime, the traveler
proceeds across the countryside, and if he encounters a fence erected by
90.

Administrative efficiency refers to reducing the administrative costs of
enforcement. See id. at 1093. Administrative efficiency is one component
of the larger concept of economic efficiency, also known as Paretooptimality, in which allocation choices “lead to that allocation of resources
which could not be improved in the sense that a further change would not
so improve the condition of those who gained by it that they could
compensate those who lost from it and still be better off than before”. Id.
at 1094. As an analysis of Pareto-optimality is beyond the scope of this
article, we limit our discussion of efficiency to administrative efficiency.

91.

See id. at 1091.

92.

See id. at 1092.

93.

Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 15
(1960) (discussed in Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1094 n.12 and
accompanying text).

94.

This exercise resembles the acquisition by eminent domain of “rights of
way” by railroad and telegraph companies across large stretches of the
American west.
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an occupier, he may sue the occupier for damages. Assuming that
occupiers of land understand that they will be liable for damages if they
erect fences across a traveler’s route, then only occupiers who place a
value on their privacy in excess of the level of damages will erect fences.
In a property rule regime, these are the occupiers that would have
successfully bargained with the traveler, paying him to take an
alternate route to avoid crossing their land.
The question which of these approaches – property or liability – is
more efficient depends on a range of factors including the cost of fences
and the ease of getting around them. If there are few occupiers willing
to erect fences in the face of a damages lawsuit, then the liability regime
will be more efficient than obtaining pre-clearance to cross each parcel
along the desired route. But if fences are likely to pop up across every
parcel along the route, then the traveler would be better off, and
efficiency would be served, by obtaining an ex ante injunctive order to
cross each parcel rather than litigating against the builder of each fence
ex post.
Table 1 below summarizes the options available for the allocation
of entitlements and remedies under the Melamed and Calabresi
framework using our stylized example of an occupier of land and a
traveler who wishes to traverse that land.95
Table 1
Calabresi and Melamed – Entitlements under Property and Liability Rules

B. Distributional Effects

As observed by Calabresi and Melamed, “the placement of
entitlements has a fundamental effect on a society’s distribution of
wealth.”96 Distributional effects can arise both from the choice of initial
entitlements and the choice between property and liability regimes. In
the scenario described above, if initial entitlements are placed with land
occupiers, then under a property rule regime, an occupier who values
her privacy can prevent a traveler from crossing her land at no cost. If
a traveler wishes to cross, he would have to pay her the value that she
places on her privacy, say $5. In a liability rule regime, if a traveler
crosses her land without permission, then she can recover that $5 in
95.

See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1115-16.

96.

Id. at 1098.
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damages from him. If, however, initial entitlements are placed with
travelers, then in a property rule regime, the occupier would have to
pay the traveler to refrain from crossing her land at the value he places
on making the crossing (say $7). Likewise, if she erects a fence under a
liability rule regime, the traveler can recover damages from her (also
$7). Thus, depending on the initial allocation of entitlements, and
absent transaction costs, in order to prevent the traveler from crossing
her land, the occupier will either spend $0 or $7. The converse holds
true for the traveler if he wishes to cross against the will of the occupier.
The placement of initial entitlements thus has a clear distributional
effect, even if it does not impact the ultimate use of a particular asset.
In addition to the straightforward distributional effects arising from
placement of entitlements, transaction costs play a large role in skewing
the distribution of wealth. Thus, it is well-known that the cost of
enforcing rights can be significant, and that large enterprises are more
likely and able to enforce their rights in court than individuals.
Likewise, the cost of monitoring compliance with legal rules can be
significant, and larger organizations are often better placed than
individuals to effectively monitor compliance. As a result, parties that
are less able and willing to assert their rights will often forego remedies
that might otherwise be available to them.
Finally, it is important to note that, despite the stylized analysis
common to discussions of property and liability rules, the “damages”
available to an entitlement holder under a liability rule framework will
not necessarily reflect actual harm or injury to the entitlement holder,
or the value that either party places on the activity in question. Rather,
for purposes of administrability and uniformity, the amounts levied on
parties in liability rule regimes may be fixed by the state in a manner
that does not take into account the particular preferences or
circumstances of the parties at all. Speeding fines, for example, are fixed
by the state without regard to the driver’s wealth, ability to pay, or the
urgency of his need to get to his destination. With respect to intellectual
property, an example can be found in the compulsory licensing scheme
for musical compositions under the U.S. Copyright Act.97 Under this
framework, the copyright in a composition (the entitlement) resides
with the composer, yet any person wishing to make a recording of the
composition after the initial recording is released (i.e., a cover or remake
version) may do so without the copyright owner’s permission upon
payment of a royalty fixed by the governmental Copyright Royalty
Board.98 And in some cases, such user privileges (as in the case of fair

97.

17 U.S.C. § 115 (2016).

98.

17 U.S.C. § 801(a) (2018).
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use under the Copyright Act99) may be granted against an entitlement
with no monetary compensation whatsoever.100
C. Justice and Social Welfare

Calabresi and Melamed observe that “those preferences which
cannot be easily explained in terms of [a] few broadly accepted
distributional preferences, or in terms of efficiency, are termed justice
reasons.”101 Yet, Calabresi and Melamed appear uncomfortable with the
notion of justice. They explain, in economic terms, that most social
preferences, even seemingly non-quantitative values such as equality,
can be grounded in distributional preferences or efficiency motivations
or both.102 They thus cut short their discussion of justice without
offering tangible examples of those “idiosyncratic” values that cannot
be placed within the rubrics of either distribution or efficiency.103
We do not share this seeming discomfort with the notion of justice.
Clearly, in the area of human subjects research, considerations of
individual autonomy, choice, privacy, and dignity are important.
Likewise, where research using individual health data is concerned,
these considerations must be taken into account, for reasons of fairness
and justice, if nothing else.
Though important, we do not view these considerations as preempting all others. Social welfare (e.g., identifying risk factors and
finding new cures for disease), which sounds in economic efficiency and
distributional concerns, is also important. And, in some cases, the
promotion of social welfare can outweigh an absolutist deference to
individual choice. Some commentators, in fact, speak of an individual
ethical obligation, grounded in principles of beneficence and justice, to
help others by participating in socially beneficial research.104 As
explained by Patrick Taylor,
99.

17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992).

100. See Dan L. Burk, Critical Analysis: Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Molecular Futures – Bargaining in the Shadow of the Cathedral, in GENE
PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS 294, 301 (Geertrui van
Overwalle, ed., 2009).
101. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1105.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Cohen, Duty to Share, supra note 70, at 216-18 (discussing arguments
by Alan Wertheimer and others regarding a moral duty to participate in
research); Brent Mittelstadt et al., Is There a Duty to Participate in
Digital Epidemiology? 14 LIFE SCI., SOC’Y & POL’Y 1, 4-5 (2018)
(summarizing justifications for a “moral duty for patients to contribute
to biomedical research,” including arguments grounded in beneficence,
avoidance of free riding, public goods and solidarity); David Orentlicher,
Making Research a Requirement of Treatment – Why We Should
Sometimes Let Doctors Pressure Patients to Participate in Research, 35
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 20, 21 (2005) (“linking treatment to participation in
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An enduring ethical position is that we should reciprocate in
social arrangements through which we ourselves benefit, when the
duties are fairly distributed across society. A good example is
improvement to health-care quality, for which access to all
patient outcomes is critical. Risks from participation are low, and
benefits to all are high. We depend on participation, and share a
duty to participate in return. We cannot simply demand the
benefit and decline the cost.105

We, too, believe that promoting biomedical discovery to improve
overall human health is an important social goal that should be set
aside only for reasons recognized as highly compromising or injurious
to individuals. For example, if a researcher wished to publish the names
and street addresses of participants in a mental health study so as to
“personalize” his results for a magazine article, considerations of
individual privacy should clearly override any marginal benefit that
such disclosure might achieve. By the same token, if an individual who
participated in a genetic study bore a personal animus toward members
of a different ethnic group and wished to allow the use of her
anonymized data for research concerning diseases affecting her own
ethnicity, but not those primarily affecting the other ethnic group, there
would be few legitimate reasons that such a request should be honored,
notwithstanding the entitlement holder’s personal preference. Thus,
while important, personal autonomy cannot override the broader needs
of society.106 In our proposals below, we seek to promote a system that
appropriately balances interests of personal privacy, autonomy, and
self-determination with broader considerations of social welfare.
D. Entitlements and the Role of the State

As initially formulated by Calabresi and Melamed, initial
entitlements are set by the state within a framework in which
enforcement mechanisms are enabled by the state’s authority.107 Thus,
the state provides a judicial system that adjudicates and enforces
judgments awarded to private parties, but the responsibility for
monitoring compliance with entitlement rules and bringing actions to
enforce them rests with those private parties. Likewise, when a party
brings an action seeking damages against another party (e.g., for
trespass), those damages are paid to the aggrieved party and are not
remitted to the state, even though the state’s authority enables the
research could be a valuable and ethically sound way to increase patient
participation, as long as the clinical trial involves a comparison of
alternative, established therapies”).
105. Taylor, supra note 61, at 32.
106. See id. at 33 (“If we protect privacy effectively, we will not reduce ethics
to autonomy, and autonomy to data ownership.”).
107. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1090-91.
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aggrieved party to enforce its judgment against the liable party. In this
framework, the state acts largely in the background and is not itself a
principal actor, except as the setter of rules and allocator of initial
entitlements.
It is often the case, however, that the state intervenes more directly
in the monitoring and enforcement of non-compliance with conditions
imposed on those entitlements. As conceptualized by Henry Smith, a
more finely-grained determination of permitted and prohibited
activities involving an entitlement is sometimes preferable to the broadbrushed right to exclude that traditionally accompanies property
rights.108 This “governance” approach lends itself to governmental
regulation rather than private enforcement of rights. For example, the
state may grant an entitlement, such as the right to build a power
plant, that is conditioned on the ex ante payment of a permitting fee
to the state.109 The state may also impose ex ante licensure and approval
requirements before some activity is undertaken (e.g., a requirement
that a safety inspection be passed, or that drivers pass written tests
and vision exams before being permitted to drive on public roads).110
The state may also impose ex post fines and penalties when private
behavior violates rules or regulations.111 For example, parking on the
public streets of a densely-populated neighborhood can be restricted to
those displaying a residential parking permit. When a non-resident
illegally parks on the street, making it more difficult for residents to
find parking, private litigation by affected residents may not be
efficient. Instead, the city issues a ticket and fine to the offender and,
under some circumstances, tows the offending car away. The remedies
available to the state can be exercised both speedily and objectively, in
a manner much more effective than private litigation by aggrieved
residents. However, when a parking ticket is issued, the fine is paid to
the state, not to the aggrieved residents. The benefit they receive is not
a share of the parking fine, but the improved enjoyment of their parking
entitlement which is made possible through the state’s enforcement
mechanisms.
The remedial options available to the state when it intervenes to
protect entitlements differ structurally from the options available to
individuals making use of the legal system in order to obtain injunctions
or seek damages. Shavell illustrates the different remedial options
available to individuals and to the state in the context of risk regulation
in Table 2 below.112
108. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for
Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEG. STUD. S453, S454-55 (2002).
109. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1099.
110. Id.
111. SHAVELL, supra note 11, at 278.
112. Id.
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Table 2
Shavell – Ex ante and Ex post remedies for risk control

As explained by Shavell, in the context of different types of risk
avoidance, there may be advantages to giving remedies, and the
principal responsibility for policing behavior, to the state.113 For
example, the state may be a more effective ex ante judge than
individuals whether a particular activity (e.g., constructing a building)
meets acceptable safety levels (e.g., building codes). It may also impose
conditions, such as training and licensure of new drivers, on the conduct
of risky activity. Likewise, ex post, it may be more efficient for the state
to conduct building inspections and levy fines and corrective penalties
against builders that do not meet code than to rely on individuals
discovering such violations and bringing private enforcement actions. If
society’s goal is to detect as many safety risks as possible, then relying
on the state rather than individuals may be preferable. And from the
standpoint of remedies, paying an ex post fine to the state, which may
support the state’s monitoring and inspection functions, may be more
socially valuable than permitting individuals to seek and collect windfall
monetary damages. The state, which can be deemed to act on behalf of
its citizens, can thus be considered as a proxy for its citizens in terms
of collection of damages affecting society broadly.
In addition to which party is the more efficient policer of activity
and recipient of damages (the individual or the state), Shavell asks
whether ex ante or ex post remedies are more likely to achieve desired
social outcomes.114 One consideration, for example, is whether a violator
would generally have the ability to pay ex post damages for harm that
it caused. If, on balance, it would not (either because violators have few
assets or because likely harms are very large - e.g., nuclear plant
disasters), then ex ante charges and inspections prior to allowing risky
activity might be preferred.115

113. Id. at 281-82.
114. Id. at 279.
115. See id. at 284.
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Shavell also addresses those situations in which state-imposed
criminal sanctions may be desirable to address non-compliance with
rules associated with entitlements. In general, he concludes that
criminal penalties are advisable when monetary penalties are unlikely
to deter undesirable behavior (e.g., when the injurer has few assets, or
has set out to do harm).116
E. Combining the Frameworks – Entitlements and Health Information

When considering the optimal framework for governing research
using personal health information, it is useful to combine the
approaches outlined by Calabresi and Melamed, with respect to initial
entitlements, and that of Shavell, with respect to state versus private
remedies. To simplify matters, we make the initial and, hopefully noncontroversial, decision to place the initial entitlement with respect to
individual health data with the individual. This placement is both
intuitive and generally consistent with existing legal regimes that
protect an individual’s privacy in health-related data.
A second adjustment that we make to the Shavell framework is
including publicly-chartered data repositories within the ambit of state
(governmental) actors. These data repositories include biobanks and
databases that are operated or overseen by governmental agencies,
academic institutions, hospital networks, and non-profit research
centers.117 We group these organizations together with more traditional
governmental agencies even though some of them are not, strictly
speaking, governmental bodies, due to their overall similarity and
position with respect to health data users (researchers) and individual
data subjects. That is, these data repositories act as the custodians of
individual data under a relationship of trust and stewardship and
conduct their operations in the public interest, along with other
governmental regulatory and enforcement bodies. We thus treat them
together.
Third, in the area of remedies, we distinguish between penalties
imposed on individual researchers and on the institutions that employ
them. This differentiation allows graduation of penalties based on
severity and prevalence within an institution. In addition, imposing
penalties at an institutional level may create strong incentives within
institutions to educate individual researchers regarding the relevant
rules and restrictions concerning individual data usage, to monitor

116. Id. at 284-85.
117. For a discussion of state-operated genomic data repositories such as
GenBank and the Database of Genotypes and Phenotypes (dbGaP), see
Jorge L. Contreras, Leviathan in the Commons: Biomedical Data and the
State in GOVERNING MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 19, 27-28
(Katherine J. Strandburg et al., eds., 2017) [hereinafter Contreras,
Biomedical Data].
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research compliance with those rules and restrictions, and to mitigate
any violations that are discovered at an early stage.
Given these considerations, Table 3 below illustrates the relevant
structural options with respect to the governance of research using
human health information.
Table 3
Structural Governance Options for Health Information
(initial entitlement in data subject)

1.

Property Rules Enforced by Data Subjects – Consent

With the initial entitlement assigned to an individual data subject,
the individual’s ex ante consent is required in order to permit databased research. This scenario is akin to that of the traveler requiring ex
ante permission from each land occupier to cross their land. As
discussed elsewhere, there are serious doubts concerning the legitimacy
and validity of individual consent in the healthcare setting, at least in
the manner in which consent is sought and obtained today.118 And as
discussed in Section I.C above, a property rule system requiring
advance consent from every data subject imposes significant costs and
delays on socially valuable research programs, particularly when they
involve thousands or millions of individuals, and can also result in the
compromise of data sets and analysis. For all of these reasons, we do
not recommend this approach.
2.

Property Rules Enforced by the State – Consultation and Licensure

In a system in which the state acts as the representative or proxy
for individuals, the state may “consent” to the use of individual health
data subject to certain conditions. In a property rule (ex ante) regime,
this advance authorization may be conditioned upon the satisfaction of
certain criteria, which might include outreach to and engagement with
118. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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relevant communities and community leaders, as well as adequate
training and licensure of researchers.
The engagement of researchers with patient advocacy groups has
shown particular promise with closely knit disease-specific
communities119 and minority or disadvantaged groups.120 We support
inclusive outreach measures along these lines. However, we do not
believe that these forms of patient engagement and outreach need to be
mandated by property rules, and also suspect that advocates of
individual consent would find such approaches, standing alone, to be
inadequate.
Likewise, requirements such as training and licensure of researchers
regarding proper research usage of individual data seems to be a
necessary but insufficient measure. Regular training of all members of
a research team engaged in human subjects research is already required
by the U.S. National Institutes of Health for all NIH-funded studies,121
and should continue to be required. But, as the example of traffic
violations illustrates, driver training and licensure alone are seldom
sufficient to ensure compliance with applicable rules.
3.

Liability Rules Enforced by Individuals - Compensatory Damages

In the realm of liability rules, individual entitlement holders may
sue unauthorized infringers on their entitlements for monetary
damages. Thus, just as a property occupier may sue an unauthorized
trespasser for compensatory damages, an individual could sue an
unauthorized user of her personal health data.
Numerous existing private causes of action may already be brought
with respect to the misuse of personal data, many of which can result
in an award of monetary damages to the injured data subject. Damages
in such cases may be compensatory and may also reflect a punitive or

119. See, e.g., Sharon F. Terry et al., Science and Society: Advocacy Groups
as Research Organizations: The PXE International Example, 8 NATURE
REV. GENETICS 157 (2007) (detailing interaction between researchers and
gene-specific disease advocacy communities); Knoppers, supra note 35, at
213 (noting HUGO support for “prior discussion and consultation with
communities and populations”). Cf. Lee A. Bygrave & Dag Wiese
Schartum, Consent, Proportionality, and Collective Power, in
REINVENTING DATA PROTECTION 157 (Serge Gutwirth, et al., eds., 2009)
(introducing concept of collective consent).
120. See, e.g., James V. Lavery, Building an Evidence Base for Stakeholder
Engagement, 361 SCIENCE 554 (2018) (citing, among other examples,
outreach to the Havasupai community).
121. Required Educ. in the Protection of Human Res. Participants, Notice OD00-039, Natl. Inst. Health (June 5, 2000), https://grants.nih.gov/
grants/guide/notice-files/not-od-00-039.html.
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exemplary character.122 For example, the U.S. Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) prohibits discrimination by employers
and health insurers on the basis of an individual’s genetic information.123
The conduct prohibited by GINA is far-reaching, as the statute bars
even the collection of employee genetic information by an employer.124
Employment-based actions under GINA are filed by aggrieved
employees with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), and then advance through an administrative process which is
subject to appeal to the courts.125 The largest GINA verdict of which
we are aware was an award of $2.2 million to two employees of a
company that sought to collect DNA samples from them while
investigating the vandalism of one of its warehouses.126
Other causes of action may give an individual a monetary remedy
when data about the individual is used in a manner to which he or she
has not consented. These include common law actions for violation of
privacy, deceit, fraud, deception, and breach of fiduciary duty (usually
brought in the context of a healthcare provider).127 In the famous Moore
122. In a recent article, Lauren Scholz argues that restitution is the proper
measure of privacy damages. Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy Remedies, 94
IND. L. REV. 1,1 (2018).
123. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-223,
122 Stat. 881 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and
42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter GINA]. For a general discussion of GINA and an
assessment of its first ten years in force, see Bradley A. Arehardt & Jessica
L. Roberts, GINA, Big Data, and the Future of Employee Privacy, 128
YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2019); Barbara J. Evans, The Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act at Age 10: GINA’s Controversial
Assertion that Data Transparency Protects Privacy and Civil Rights, 60
WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2019); Contreras, Genetic Property,
supra note 15, at 41-43 (discussing liability rule framework under GINA).
Protections such as those offered by GINA are not unique to the United
States. Aime Keis, Biobanking in Estonia, J.L. MED. & ETHICS 20, 22
(2016) (Estonian law “prohibits discrimination and stigmatization of gene
donors” and “[p]roviding any [genetic] information to insurance companies
or employers”).
124. GINA, Sec. 202(b).
125. See GINA 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (2015).
126. Lowe v. Atlas Logistics Grp. Retail Serv. (Atlanta), LLC, 102 F. Supp.
3d 1360, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (the vandalism included the placement of
human feces in one of the company’s warehouses, which the company
sought to identify by matching it to the DNA of its employees).
127. For a more detailed discussion of these causes of action, see Contreras,
Genetic Property, supra note 15, at 51-53. Jack Balkin has introduced the
idea of an information fiduciary, “a person or business who, because of
their relationship with another, has taken on special duties with respect
to the information they obtain in the course of the relationship.” Jack M.
Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1183, 1209 (2016). This concept appears well-suited to frame
private actions and liability for health data breaches.
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case, even though Mr. Moore’s property law conversion claim failed, he
succeeded in his tort and fiduciary claims against UCLA and its
physicians.128
We support the use of ex post liability rules such as these to govern
the use of individual health data. However, we feel that liability rules
based on individual enforcement are insufficient. As noted above,
individuals often lack the expertise, resources, and information
necessary to monitor and police behavior of data users.129 Moreover,
U.S. tort law does not offer particularly generous remedies for purely
dignitary harms,130 and, as noted by Litman in questioning the
effectiveness of tort law for regulating data privacy, “common law
lawmaking is ordinarily both gradual and slow.”131 Accordingly, we
would reserve individual-based actions to those that are likely to have
a significant and particularized impact on the individual’s personal or
financial condition. For more diffuse and generalized harms, we
recommend actions initiated by public authorities, as described below.132
4.

Rules Enforced by Public Authorities – Institutional and
Professional Penalties

As summarized in Table 3, in addition to injured individuals, data
repositories and governmental agencies (public authorities) may bring
actions to enforce data usage rules. The policing of data usage by public
authorities in the area of healthcare is far from new. Federal rules
governing the appropriate usage of individual health data exist in both
the so-called “Common Rule” that applies to all federally funded
research on human subjects133 and the HIPAA Privacy Rule.134 Given
the superior information that public authorities would likely have about
128. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 493 (Cal. 1990); see
also Litman, supra note 32, at 1308 (discussing tort and fiduciary remedies
for privacy violations).
129. For a more detailed discussion of monitoring and enforcement costs in the
context of genetic data regulation, see Contreras, Genetic Property, supra
note 15, at 48-49.
130. See, e.g., William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering:
A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 877 (1939) (“If the plaintiff is to
recovery every time that her feelings are hurt, we should all be in court
twice a week.”); Russell Fraker, Reformulating Outrage: A Critical
Analysis of the Problematic Tort of IIED, 61 VAND. L. REV. 983, 10001001 (2008).
131. Litman, supra note 32, at 1313.
132. Litman also appears, though somewhat unenthusiastically, to support a
combined tort and regulatory approach. Litman, supra note 32, at 1313
(“If what data privacy really needs is federal statutory protection, tort
litigation is actually a plausible route to enactment”).
133. General Requirements for Informed Consent, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2017).
134. 45 C.F.R. § 160 (2003); 45 C.F.R. § 164 (2003).
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data usage practices, as well as superior resources for monitoring
compliance with data usage rules, public authorities are likely to be in
a better position than affected individuals to ensure broad rule
compliance and achievement of data protection and privacy goals. We
thus recommend ex post public authority enforcement as a preferred
method for regulating research using individual health information.
a.

Monetary Fines and Penalties

As part of their enforcement function, public authorities may seek
to impose monetary fines and penalties on violators of these rules. Such
penalties are sometimes imposed today in particularly egregious cases
of research misconduct.135 The authority to impose such fines and
penalties is inherent to governmental agencies but could also be
authorized by contracts between data repositories and data users. The
imposition of fines and penalties in the context of research misconduct
has historically been rare. The possibility of such penalties, however,
has become more prominent in Europe following implementation of the
GDPR, which imposes substantial monetary fines for misuse of personal
data,136 and in the United States following Duke University’s recent
agreement to pay $112.5 million in settlement of a range of research
misconduct claims.137
b.

Remediation

In addition to monetary remedies, many cases of research
misconduct involve remedies designed to reverse the harmful effects of
a particular violation. Such remedies include heightened oversight,138
retraction of published papers,139 disgorgement of grant awards,140 and,
135. See, e.g., Greg Langlois, Pitt Prof to Pay $132K for Science Research
False Grant Claims, BNA LIFE SCI. L. & INDUS. RPT., Mar. 23, 2018
(“University of Pittsburgh professor required to pay penalty of $132.027
for allegedly falsifying data in NSF grant applications”).
136. See, e.g., Marelli & Testa, supra note 62, at 496 (fines of up to 20 million
Euros or 4% of a company’s annual global revenue).
137. See Sheila Kaplan, Duke University to Pay $112.5 Million to Settle Claims
(Mar.
25,
2019),
of
Research
Misconduct,
N.Y. TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/25/science/duke-settlementresearch.html.
138. See, e.g., Alison McCook, Duke’s Mishandling of Misconduct Prompts
New U.S. Government Grant Oversight, SCIENCE, Mar. 23, 2018,
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/03/duke-s-mishandlingmisconduct-prompts-new-us-government-grant-oversight
(U.S.
NIH
imposes stringent oversight requirements on Duke University in the wake
of misconduct allegations).
139. See, e.g., RETRACTION WATCH, https://retractionwatch.com (last visited
May 17, 2018) (cataloging retraction of scientific papers).
140. Disgorgement is a rare and severe remedy. See Leonid Schneider, What if
Universities Had to Agree to Refund Grants Whenever There was a
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in relation to the proposal made in this paper, the deletion of ill-gotten
or misused data.
Remedies such as these are typically designed to be obtained by
governmental agencies, though in the case of health information, data
repositories might also be in a position to seek such remedies when
authorized under applicable contractual arrangements. In the case of
remediation remedies, it is important that individual data subjects not
have the right to seek the destruction or return of data pertaining to
themselves. Conceding such a right would push health information back
toward a property rule regime and the welfare reducing outcomes seen
in cases such as Beleno and Havasupai. Thus, the right to require
deletion or destruction of health data should be used sparingly, and
only against a particular data misuser, rather than the entire research
community.
c.

Debarment

Though imposed only occasionally, one of the most punitive
remedies available in research misconduct cases is the debarment of
individual researchers or, on rare occasions, institutions, from certain
benefits or privileges. Typically, debarment prohibits a researcher from
participating in government-funded research, or seeking further
research funding, for one to three years.141 Because of the significant
impact that debarment can have on an individual’s career, this remedy
is sought and imposed only a handful of times per year by the major
scientific funding agencies in the United States.142 Debarment of
research institutions from seeking federal grant support is largely
unheard of, given the catastrophic effect that such a measure would
likely have on most research institutions. However, debarment of
contractors (including large firms) from seeking and obtaining
government contracts is not uncommon in cases of fraud,
embezzlement, unfair trade practices, failure to perform, and other
inappropriate conduct.143 Debarment remedies could also be extended
to biomedical research institutions.
Retraction?,
RETRACTIONWATCH
(Jan.
19,
2015),
https://retractionwatch.com/2015/01/19/universities-agree-refundgrants-whenever-retraction/.
141. See, e.g., Jeannie Baumann, New York University Professor Slapped with
Research Debarment, BNA LIFE SCI. L. & INDUS. RPT., Mar. 21, 2018
(reporting on a former NYU professor debarred from government-funded
research for three years after allegedly falsifying images in published
papers); Findings of Research Misconduct, NATL. INST. HEALTH (Apr. 19,
2018),
https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-18169.html (recounting the story of a UNC researcher debarred from
federally-funded research for two years after finding of data falsification).
142. See Jeffrey Mervis, After the Fall, 354 SCIENCE 408, 409 (2016).
143. See Frequently Asked Questions: Suspension and Debarment, U.S. GEN.
SERVICES ADMIN., https://www.gsa.gov/about-us/organization/office-of-
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In the case of data misuse, debarment remedies could include
blocking the access of individual researchers or institutions to some or
all data. Unlike several other remedies discussed above, debarment in
the case of data misuse would likely be sought by the data repository
(rather than an aggrieved individual or government agency) given the
repository’s custodial role over such data.
d.

Other Penalties

In addition to the penalties described above, research institutions
may impose professional sanctions on individual researchers that violate
rules regarding data access and use. These sanctions may range from
minor (e.g., warnings) to severe (e.g., demotion or dismissal). While
only the institution itself has the authority to impose these sanctions,
either a governmental agency or a data repository may require an
institution to discipline its individual researchers as part of the
conditions permitting institutional access to a data resource.
Finally, it is always the case that violation of data privacy or
security rules may result in civil or criminal penalties beyond what may
be stipulated in a set of data access rules. Enforcement of these legal
penalties is the sole province of government and should generally be
reserved for violations of the most serious nature.
5. A Proposed Rule Framework for Health Information

To summarize the above, we propose that research using individual
health data should be subject to a regulatory regime, enforceable by
government/public repositories, while at the same time permitting
limited private enforcement actions to address particularized individual
injury. Thus, while the physical collection of human tissue would
continue to be subject to existing rules regarding informed consent,144
ex ante consent would not be required for the use of information derived
from physical samples. Rather, rules regarding proper research use of
health information would be put in place, and violations of those rules
governmentwide-policy/office-of-acquisition-policy/gsa-acq-policyintegrity-workforce/suspension-debarment-division/suspensiondebarment/frequently-asked-questions-suspension-debarment#Q4
reviewed Feb. 26, 2019).

(last

144. For example, physical DNA samples could be collected during any routine
medical procedure to which the subject consented, or via a special
procedure (e.g., saliva swab, blood draw) for which any physical risks were
adequately disclosed and to which the subject has consented. Likewise,
DNA collected through non-invasive means, such as the collection of crime
scene evidence, would not trigger any consent requirement. See, e.g.,
Rebecca Robins, The Golden State Killer Case Was Cracked with
Genealogy Website. What Does That Mean for Genetic Privacy? STAT
(Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/04/26/genealogygolden-state-killer-privacy/ (describing the apprehension of a notorious
serial killer by combining DNA evidence with public databases, all
without the consent of the suspect).
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could be dealt with on an ex post basis. The precise conduct that these
rules would cover remains open to debate, and should be discussed
broadly by researchers, research funders, and patient groups. A range
of commentators have proposed that data usage and privacy rules be
enhanced to prevent misuse of personal data, re-identification of data
subjects, insufficient data security measures, and other misuses.145
Existing examples of data usage and protection rules are described in
the case studies in Part III below.
Whatever rules are put in place, researchers who violate those rules
would be subject to penalties that could include monetary damages and
fines, debarment, and remedial measures. However, data would not
have to be destroyed or removed from existing data sets, and
permissible research using that data could continue unabated. Thus,
while deterrents would exist to dissuade individual and institutional
researchers from engaging in abusive practices, socially beneficial
research by innocent researchers could continue unimpeded. And
because ex ante consent from every research participant would not be
required, the efficiency of the research enterprise would be improved.146

145. See, e.g. Contreras, Genetic Property, supra note 15, at 44-48 (proposing
liability rules to enhance existing GINA protections, prohibit
reidentification of data subjects, restrict commercial uses of data and
enhance data security); Taylor, supra note 61, at 33 (“Governments
should broaden privacy protections to extend across all organizations
and agencies that hold sensitive information, including web service
providers, pharmaceutical companies, corporate data-miners,
providers of personal health records, universities and government.
Reidentifiability must be addressed and prevented in cases in which
extensive linkage between health and genetic information is
maintained.”); Cohen & Mello, supra note 60, at 232 (proposing
“expanding the penalties and civil remedies available for data breaches
and misuse, including reidentification attempts” and “a general rule
protecting health data that specifies further, custodian-specific rights”).
146. Overall cost savings would emerge if the cost of monitoring and enforcing
noncompliance with research rules (see Contreras, Letter, supra note 6, at
48-50 (discussing monitoring and enforcement costs)) were lower than the
cost of seeking and obtaining consent from all research participants. As
such, it is likely that overall costs will be lower under a liability rule
system in scenarios with large numbers of individual participants (ex ante
consent cost) and a low incidence of noncompliance with rules (ex post
enforcement cost). It is a separate question how these overall costs are
allocated. Without state intervention, it can be assumed that ex ante
consent costs will be borne by researchers and ex post monitoring and
enforcement costs will be borne by individual research subjects. The state
can adjust initial entitlements and burdens to reflect social priorities. For
example, in the case studies described in Section II.B. below, the state
itself has assumed the burden of compliance monitoring and enforcement
(see supra note 187 and accompanying text).
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III. Rules for Health Data Research - Two Case
Studies
In this section we present two case studies – one from the United
States and one from Denmark – in which governmental rules have been
used successfully to govern large-scale repositories of health data. These
repositories each operate under a statutory mandate independent of
general rules governing human subjects research and informed consent.
These case studies demonstrate that a regulatory framework, in lieu of
a property rule framework, may be both practical and useful in
governing research using human health data.
A. Utah Population Database (UPDB)

The Utah Population Database (UPDB) comprises a large set of
linked health, genealogical and demographic records pertaining to
residents of the U.S. state of Utah, their relatives, and their ancestors
around the world.147 The resource, which extends back to the late
eighteenth century (seventeen generations), contains more than thirtyone million records with data from nearly ten million individuals.148 The
UPDB is unique in that it links records from three distinct types of
sources: state and federal vital statistics records (birth, death, marriage,
divorce, drivers’ license, Social Security, and voting registration
records), nearly two million multigenerational genealogical records from
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the Mormon church),149
and more than 500,000 state cancer registry records (which, in recent
years, have included an increasing number of biospecimens).150 The

147. See generally Ken R. Smith et al., The Utah Population Database: A
Model for Linking Medical Genealogical Records for Population Health
(forthcoming); Lisa A. Cannon Albright, Utah Family-Based Analysis:
Past, Present and Future, 65 HUMAN HEREDITY 209, 210 (2008); Mark H.
Skolnick, The Utah Genealogical Database: A Resource for
Genetic Epidemiology, in BANBURY REPORT NO. 4: CANCER INCIDENCE IN
DEFINED POPULATIONS 285, 285, 287 (John Cairns et al., eds., 1980).
148. See Smith et al., supra note 147, at 5; Utah Population Database,
HUNTSMAN
CANCER
INST.,
https://healthcare.utah.edu/
huntsmancancerinstitute/research/updb/data/ (last updated June 8,
2018) [hereinafter UPDB Data].
149. The Mormon faith places a high value on ancestral and genealogical
information. As such, the Mormon church maintains what it claims to be
“the largest collection of family records in the world”, containing
information on an estimated 3 billion living and deceased individuals from
more than 100 countries. Genealogy, CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY
SAINTS,
https://www.mormonnewsroom.org/topic/
genealogy (last accessed Mar. 08, 2019).
150. See UPDB Data, supra note 148. Cancer registry data includes
approximately 350,000 records from the Utah Cancer Registry and
200,000 records from the Idaho Cancer Registry. Cancer is a reportable
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compilation and linkage of these data sets enable a range of
epidemiological and genetic studies. For example, the linkage of
multigenerational family genealogies with death records and cancer
registry data has enabled the identification of familial patterns of cancer
susceptibility across a wide range of tumor types, which can then
facilitate recruitment to further studies.151
The state of Utah, like all U.S. states, provides for the collection of
health data for statistical and public health purposes. This power is
currently delegated to the Utah Department of Health, which has the
authority to collect and maintain a broad range of health data.152
Personally identifiable health data collected by the Department may
not be disclosed except with the consent of the data subject153 or under
a number of statutory exceptions. One of these exceptions permits the
disclosure of health data “for bona fide research and statistical
purposes” as determined by the Department, provided that the
recipient of the information enters into a written agreement to protect
the data in accordance with legal requirements and not to permit its
further disclosure.154 The use of individual health data for research
purposes is further protected under a statutory liability shield, which
permits any person, without incurring liability, to provide data relating
to the “condition and treatment” of an individual, as well as familial
and other related information, to “scientific and health care research
organizations affiliated with institutions of higher education” for the
purpose of “study and advancing medical research” among other
things.155
The linkage of Utah vital statistics records with Mormon
genealogical records began in the early 1970s through a collaboration
between the University of Utah and the Mormon church.156 In 1982,
Governor Scott Matheson issued an Executive Order creating the Utah
Resource for Genetic and Epidemiologic Research (RGE) as a “data
resource for the collection, storage, study, and dissemination of medical
and related information” to be used “for the purpose of reducing
morbidity or mortality, or for the purpose of evaluating and improving
condition in many states including Utah. UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.384100-1 (2017).
151. See Smith et al, supra note 147, at 3, 15; Cannon Albright, supra note
147, at 210-218.
152. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-3-2 (LexisNexis 2017) (enacted 1981).
153. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-3-7(1) (LexisNexis 2017) (enacted 1981).
154. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-3-7(3) (LexisNexis 2017) (enacted 1981). See
also UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-3-10 (LexisNexis 2017) (enacted 1981)
(pertaining to Department measures required to protect identifiable
health data).
155. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-25-1(1)-(3) (LexisNexis 2017) (enacted 1981).
156. Smith et al., supra note 147, at 4.
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the quality of hospital and medical care.”157 The RGE was originally
administered by the Utah Department of Health, but in 1986 this
authority was transferred to the University of Utah,158 which continues
to oversee the UPDB today.
UPDB does not engage in primary data collection. Rather, it links
data from a range of public sector and private data sources, provides
front-end search and analytical capabilities, and makes these resources
available to approved researchers (discussed below). Because most data
linked by UPDB was not collected for research purposes, but for official
governmental or church recordkeeping, the consent of individual data
subjects has not been sought or obtained either by UPDB or the original
data collector (e.g., church or state agencies).159 Given this
acknowledged omission, RGE is charged with safeguarding the privacy
and security of individual data that is accessible through the UPDB.160
In order to access and use data through the UPDB, researchers
(who may be employed by non-profit or for-profit organizations) must
apply to the RGE indicating the purpose and scope of a proposed
research project.161 Each application is reviewed by the RGE Review
Committee, which consists of university faculty and RGE staff, as well
as representatives from each of the suppliers of data to the UPDB (e.g.,
Utah Cancer Registry, Mormon church, Utah Department of Health,
etc.).162 The Review Committee reviews the application as a whole,
giving particular attention to its data privacy and security plan.163 In
addition, any data contributor may “veto” the use of its data in any
given project if they feel that the use is not appropriate.164 Each user
authorized to access UPDB data is required to sign a confidentiality
agreement to protect individual-level data.165
157. Utah Exec. Order (Jul. 14, 1982).
158. Utah Exec. Order (Feb. 20, 1986).
159. See supra note 163-164 and accompanying text; see also Smith et al.,
supra note 147, at 12.
160. See Smith et al., supra note 147, at 9; Utah Resource for Genetic &
Epidemiologic Research (RGE)-Policies and Procedures, U. UTAH,
https://rge.utah.edu/policy_updb.php, (last visited Jan. 2, 2019)
[hereinafter RGE Policies].
161. RGE Policies, supra note 160, Guidelines for Use of RGE-Held Data, Sec.
I.
162. RGE Policies, supra note 160, Organization and Operation of the
Resource; Smith et al., supra note 147, at 9; Utah Resource for Genetic
& Epidemiological Research (RGE)-RGE Review Committee, U.
UTAH https://rge.utah.edu/review_committee.php (last visited Jan.
2, 2019).
163. RGE Policies, supra note 160.
164. Smith et al., supra note 147, at 9.
165. Id.
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Penalties for non-compliance with required confidentiality and
other usage restrictions are set forth in the RGE Policies as follows:
The RGE Director, using discretionary authority, may
immediately suspend an authorization based upon behavior
contrary to the best interests of the RGE or the data. The
suspension will be in effect pending an investigation by the RGE
Review Committee. Violations of any RGE rules, especially
regarding data confidentiality, will subject the individual to the
appropriate disciplinary response including suspension of user
privileges, notification of the Institutional Review Board and the
Office of the Associate Vice President for Research Integrity and
Compliance, and, as appropriate faculty discipline (see Code of
Faculty Responsibility) and investigation of possible violation of
state law (see Utah Code Section 26-25-5).166

Thus, ensuring compliance with data usage requirements is
incumbent on the RGE, acting as an agent of the state government on
behalf of individual data subjects. Data subjects have no direct
entitlement to prevent usage of data pertaining to themselves or to seek
damages for misuse of such data. Penalties for non-compliance consist
primarily of state-imposed debarment from further usage of the resource
(“suspension of user privileges”), as well as internal administrative
disciplinary procedures (e.g., for University of Utah faculty members),
and potential state prosecution.167 We are unaware of any instance in
which such penalties have been sought or imposed.
By most measures the UPDB has been a success. The quantity and
types of data that it links have steadily increased over the years of its
operation. More importantly, use of UPDB data has led to hundreds of
peer reviewed scientific publications, indicating that the availability of
this resource has helped to advance scientific understanding.168 With
the increasing linkage of stored biospecimens with existing UPDB
genealogical and statistical data, it is hoped that this resource will
continue to be a valuable resource for the research community.
B. Statistics Denmark (DST)

Statistics Denmark (DST), a division of the Danish Ministry for
Economic and Interior Affairs, has been a central authority for national
166. RGE Policies, supra note 160, Guidelines for Use of RGE-Held Data.
Under the referenced statutory section (Utah Code 26-25-5), “[a]ny use,
release or publication, negligent or otherwise, contrary to the provisions
of [Chapter 26-25] is a class B misdemeanor.”
167. Id.
168. See Utah Population Database – Publications, UNIV. UTAH,
https://healthcare.utah.edu/huntsmancancerinstitute/research/updb
/public ations/2016.php (last visited Jan. 2, 2019); Cannon Albright,
supra note 147, at 210-214.
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Danish statistics for more than 150 years and still produces official
statistics relating to the Danish population, economy, culture, and
environment.169 This data, which includes a range of vital statistics
(birth, death, marriage, divorce, etc.), is presented in a searchable,
aggregated form on the DST web site170 and is compiled in various
agency reports. It is made available to the public at no charge and may
be used for any purpose, so long as the data source is properly
acknowledged.171
All Danish citizens are assigned a unique ten-digit civil registration
(CPR) number.172 The CPR number itself is associated with
demographic information,173 and also facilitates the combination of this
data with other governmental registries covering health, education,
employment, and income information on an individual level. Further,
health data from both public and private encounters are routinely
transferred to national registries using an individual’s CPR number.174
DST offers remote access to de-identified individual level data through
CPR175 for researchers at institutions authorized by DST.176 Under
Danish law, consent must in general be obtained for health-related
research projects.177 Research based solely on registry records, however,
does not require individual consent and researchers can thus conduct
purely registry-based research projects on the Danish population using
the CPR number without the consent of the participant.178
169. STATISTICS DENMARK, https://www.dst.dk/en (last visited Mar. 8, 2019).
170. For example, users may compile data graphs and tables correlating annual
data for variables such as age, fertility rate, cause of death, marital status,
household income and immigration status. See, e.g., Population and
Elections, STATISTICS DEN., https://www.dst.dk/en/Statistik/emner/
befolkning-og-valg (last visited Jan. 17, 2018).
171. General Terms—Open Data and Copyright, STATISTICS DENMARK,
https://www.dst.dk/en/OmDS/omweb (last visited Jan. 17, 2019).
172. Carsten Bøcker Pedersen, The Danish Civil Registration System, 39
SCANDINAVIAN J. PUB. HEALTH 22, 22-23 (2011).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Under the Danish Act on Processing of Personal Data, Act No. 429 of
May 31, 2000, research results based on personal data may only be made
available on an anonymized basis. Mette Hartlev, Genomic Databases and
Biobanks in Denmark, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 743, 749-751 (2015).
176. Lau Caspar Thygesen et al., Introduction to Danish (Nationwide)
Registers on Health and Social Issues: Structure, Access, Legislation, and
Archiving, 39 SCANDINAVIAN J. PUB. HEALTH 12, 14 (2011); Data for
Research,
STATISTICS
DEN.,
https://www.dst.dk/en/TilSalg/
Forskningsservice (last visited Jan. 17, 2019).
177. See Hartlev, supra note 175, at 745.
178. Folketinget. Bekendtgørelse af lov om videnskabsetisk behandling af
sundhedsvidenskabelige forskningsprojekter. [The Danish Parliament:
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In order to access and use individual level data from DST,
researchers must sign a written researcher agreement that contains a
number of conditions and restrictions on data use.179 For example,
researchers must agree to download only aggregated results (data,
tables, figures) from DST’s servers, and not to download individuallevel data (“micro data”) pertaining to individuals, households, families,
or business entities, even if this data is accessible on the server.180 DST
offers as a rule of thumb that data transferred to a researcher’s
computer “should be aggregated to a level which can be used directly
in a publication.”181
DST also lays out a detailed set of penalties for violation of these
policies. Thus, if DST observes that individual-level data have been
transferred to a researcher’s computer, it will immediately block all
access to DST data by the researcher and its institution.182 The
researcher and its institution are then required to delete all files
containing the improperly downloaded data, and the institution must
prepare both an explanation of the violation and a remedial plan to
avoid such violations in the future.183 While DST is evaluating the
matter, access to all DST data is closed to both the researcher and the
institution.184 If such violations recur, DST may limit or close access to
the researcher and the institution for a longer period based on the
severity of the violation and the number of prior incidents.185 Figure 1
below illustrates the hierarchy of severity and recurrence-based
penalties for such data violations.

Ministerial Order on Scientific Treatment of Health Scientific Research
Projects]. (Denmark 2017 [hereinafter Danish Ministerial Order]. See also
Hartlev, supra note 175, at 746. It is the authors’ understanding, based
on Nordfalk’s communications with DST, that the enactment of the
GDPR will not require significant changes to DST’s data access and usage
policies. However, DST plans to implement a number of ministerial
changes as a result of the GDPR. For example, DST’s standard data usage
agreement will no longer require that researchers report on their research
to the Danish Data Protection Agency, as researchers will be directly
responsible for their use and handling of data.
179. GUIDELINES FOR TRANSFERRING AGGREGATED RESULTS FROM STATISTICS
DENMARK’S RESEARCH SERVICES, STATISTICS DEN. (2015) [hereinafter
DST Guidelines].
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 5.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 5-6.
185. Id. at 6-7.
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Figure 1
Statistics Denmark Advisory Summary of Sanctions in Cases of a breach of
the data confidentiality rules or data security186

As summarized in Figure 1, for an inadvertent mistake that has
only occurred once, the researcher and institution may be barred from
access to DST data for one month, while a deliberate attempt to derive
personal identities from DST data will result in the permanent exclusion
of the researcher. If the violation occurs three times within the same
institution, the institution is barred from using all DST data.187
186. Id. at 7.
187. Id. at 7.
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The framework that DST has implemented to deal with the use of
its data relies on regulatory rules. While individual data subjects have
no property-like entitlement to control the use of data once it has
entered the DST database or to exclude researchers from using that
data, DST itself imposes meaningful penalties on researchers and
institutions that violate the cardinal rule of data access: no downloading
of individual-level data. These penalties escalate based on the severity
of the violation and the degree of recurrence.
The penalties that DST imposes are of the remediation and
debarment varieties. Monetary penalties are not a part of the DST
framework at this time. DST’s remediation remedy requires the deletion
of individual-level data that was improperly downloaded to a
researcher’s computer. This remedy is reasonable and appropriate given
the outright prohibition on downloading this data. Moreover, this
remedy should have little effect on legitimate use of the data, either by
the affected institution or by others, as no bar is imposed on the
continuing use of properly downloaded aggregate data. Thus, unlike a
property rule system in which aggrieved data subjects could potentially
disrupt compliant research use of data pertaining to themselves, the
liability rule imposed by DST is narrowly focused on the offending data
and parties.
Likewise, the debarment remedies available to DST are calculated
to penalize, first, the noncompliant researcher and, in more serious or
recurring cases, its institution. The escalating nature of these penalties
is fitting as it assigns differing time periods for debarment based on
severity and recidivism. Even “permanent” debarment for an individual
or an institution, while harsher than most U.S. governmental
debarment penalties, can be seen as justified given the high premium
placed by DST on the privacy interests of its data subjects.
C. Lessons Learned from UPDB and DST

Both UPDB and DST make large quantities of individual health
data available to researchers without obtaining specific consent from
individual data subjects. Instead, the public custodians of the data
assume the responsibility for ensuring that data users observe rules and
restrictions regarding access to and use of the data. UPDB and DST
have been able to proceed in this manner because they are maintained
by governmental agencies operating, to differing degrees, outside of the
general regulatory scheme for human subjects research. UPDB, as an
arm of the Utah State Government that does not receive U.S. federal
funding, does not operate under the strictures of the Common Rule,
and DST operates under Danish national legislation that does not
require consent for register-based research.188
However, as governmental agencies, UPDB and DST are
themselves invested with a public interest role and can, as such, be
188. Danish Ministerial Order, supra note 178.
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relied upon to safeguard the privacy and other interests of individuals
whose data they maintain and make available. As a result, the need to
obtain ex ante consent from every data subject is avoided with
concomitant efficiency gains and cost savings. In turn, monitoring and
enforcement are required, but this burden has been assumed by the
state rather than individual data subjects.189
Another important feature of both of these frameworks is that
private remedies, such as those asserted in Beleno and Havasupai, are
excluded. As noted above, Utah law expressly shields those who provide
“condition and treatment” data to researchers from civil liability,
instead limiting remedies for data misuse to those specified under the
RCE statute.190 In Denmark (and under the GDPR) private remedies
are also unavailable.191 Thus, in both of these regimes, the extreme
remedies sought in cases such as Beleno (destruction of 5.3 million
infant blood spots) and Havasupai ($50 million in damages) are not
available. Table 4 below summarizes the remedy types authorized under
the UPDB and DST frameworks:
Table 4
Remedies Authorized by UPDB and DST

Type of Remedy
Compensatory damages
Fines and penalties
Remediation
Debarment
Institutional Sanction
Criminal Sanction

UPDB
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

DST
No
No192
Yes
Yes
No
No

As noted above, the data access and usage frameworks established
by the UPDB and DST are regulatory, rather than property or liability
rules. Individual data subjects have no right to pre-approve uses of their
validly-collected data, nor do they have a remedy in the event of
unauthorized access or usage. Rather, the government, acting in the
public interest, fulfills both of these roles: it determines, using a defined
administrative process, who may access and use data, and on what
terms they may do so. It also enforces compliance with its data access
189. Cf. Contreras, Biomedical Data, supra note 117, at 36-38 (discussing role
of state in enforcing rules relating to public data access).
190. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
191. See GDPR, supra note 29, at Article 83.
192. Significant fines may be imposed under the GDPR. See GDPR supra note
29.
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and usage rules and levies penalties for non-compliance. These
penalties, when warranted, may be harsh (e.g., permanent debarment
of an institution from data access in the case of DST), but in all cases
they are directed solely against the offending individuals and
institutions, not more broadly against innocent researchers who have
obtained and used the relevant data in accordance with applicable rules.
As such, the likelihood that large-scale socially valuable research will
be disrupted by the assertion of individual rights in data is substantially
reduced.
This is not to say, of course, that establishing regulatory and
liability rule regimes for the governance of data-based research will be
easy or cost-free. Fashioning such a framework requires careful
attention to potential threats to personal privacy that may arise from
contemplated research, as well as prioritization of violations and
formulation of remedies. In the U.S., general liability rules already exist
to prohibit abuses of genetic data by employers and insurers under
GINA, to protect patients from unauthorized use of data by physicians,
and to redress injuries caused by violation of privacy laws.193 Data
custodians such as UPDB have additional protections for the data that
they make available, including strict requirements regarding data
confidentiality. DST imposes serious penalties for downloading
individual-level data from its servers. Data custodians in other
jurisdictions may establish different priorities and penalties.194 Yet the
diversity that may emerge across systems should not be viewed
negatively. Differences in policy design indicate a system that is
working to tailor requirements to the needs of its stakeholders. It is the
“one size fits all” property rule framework that creates results that are
often inappropriate and mismatched to the needs of individual systems.
Once a framework for data access and usage is in place, monitoring
of compliance and enforcement against violators is required.195 Though
default allocation rules would typically place this monitoring and
compliance burden on individual data subjects, in the UPDB and DST
cases the state has shifted these burdens to a public authority.196 This
allocation is likely efficient, as individual data subjects are in a
comparatively weak position to detect noncompliance with data access
193. See Contreras, Genetic Property, supra note 15, at 41-43 (discussing
liability rules).
194. See, e.g., David Cyranoski, China Cracks Down on Genetics Breaches,
563 NATURE 301, 301 (2018) (describing Chinese Ministry of Science
enforcement actions against institutions violating genetic data sharing
rules).
195. For a more detailed discussion of monitoring and enforcement costs in the
context of genetic data regulation, see Contreras, Genetic Property, supra
note, 15, at 48-51.
196. Hartlev, supra note 175, at 747; UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-3-10 (LexisNexis
2017).
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and usage rules 197 This shift also satisfies general notions of fairness
and equity as the government is charged with safeguarding individual
interests and privacy.198 Of course, allocating these burdens to the data
custodian (whether a state agency, a university or other research
institution) increases the cost borne by these institutions. But, if the
advancement of biomedical research is a priority for the state, then it
is not unreasonable to expect the state to allocate sufficient resources
to cover these monitoring and enforcement costs.199

IV. Conclusions
The recent trend toward the propertization of human genetic and
other health data under U.S. law poses significant challenges to largescale biomedical research and public health. Property rule systems can
result in sizable up-front costs in the ex ante acquisition of informed
consent from individual data subjects, as well as the ongoing risk that
data subjects will retract consent or object to unanticipated data uses,
thus compromising existing data resources and analyses.
We argue that liability rule and regulatory frameworks, in which
data-based research is permitted but researchers are subject to penalties
for impermissible data access or usage, can offer robust protection of
individual data privacy and security while better promoting the
integrity of the research enterprise and reducing inefficiencies associated
with the acquisition of consent from large numbers of data subjects. We
propose that research using individual health data should be subject to
a regulatory regime, enforceable by government/public repositories,
while at the same time permitting limited private enforcement actions
to address particularized individual injury. Thus, though the physical
collection of human tissue would continue to be subject to existing rules
regarding informed consent, ex ante consent would not be required for
the use of information derived from physical samples. Rather, rules
regarding proper research use of health information would be put in
place, and violations of those rules could be dealt with on an ex post
basis, both through regulatory penalties and private actions.
197. It is not always the case that individual data subjects will remain unaware
of alleged rule violations, as the private actions brought in the Beleno and
Havasupai cases demonstrate. Beleno v. Lakey, 306 F.Supp.3d 930, 936-7
(2009); Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063, 1066
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
198. Thus, while shifting the monitoring and enforcement burden to a private
firm might not seem equitable, even if it were efficient, shifting the burden
from individuals to a public authority that acts on behalf of its citizens,
does not raise the same equity issues.
199. For examples of state-led initiatives in making biomedical data broadly
available and the multifaceted role of the state in such initiatives, see
Contreras, supra note 116, at 39.
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Our recommendations are supported by two cases studies: the Utah
Population Database and Statistics Denmark, both of which provide
examples of successful health data repositories that are governed by
regulatory systems. While both of these examples are drawn from
governmental data resources, the approach that they exemplify, and
their limitations on private causes of action, can be extended to
academic and other research environments. We thus recommend that
such regulatory models be considered more broadly for the governance
of research using human health data.
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